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TAX LAW-New Mexico Taxes Non-Member Indians
Who Work on a Reservation: New Mexico Taxation and
Revenue Department v. Greaves
I.

INTRODUCTION

In New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department v. Greaves' the

New Mexico Court of Appeals held that income earned by Indians on
reservations of which they are not tribal members is taxable by the state,
expressly overruling Fox v. Bureau of Revenue.2 Prior to Greaves, New
Mexico did not regard tribal affiliation to be significant in determining
the tax-exempt status of reservation Indians.3 This Note examines how
New Mexico, federal, and other state jurisdictions regard taxation of
reservation Indians. Analysis of the Greaves decision will focus primarily
on the court of appeals' reliance on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Duro v. Reina and the court of appeals' failure to recognize
the Congressional amendment which effectively overturned the Duro decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Leroy R. Greaves, an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
lived on the Jicarilla Reservation and served as Chief Judge of the Jicarilla
Tribal Court.' Greaves and appellee Elizabeth Reifel filed a joint state
personal income tax return for 1989 deducting the amount Greaves earned
that year as Chief Judge for the Jicarilla Court. 6 The deduction, initially
granted by the Taxation and Revenue Department ("Department"), was
subsequently disallowed, and the Department requested repayment. Appellees protested the adjustment, and a Department hearing officer, relying
on Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 7 ruled in their favor. The Department
appealed from that ruling. The New Mexico Court of Appeals overruled
the hearing officer's decision and held for the Department, expressly
overruling Fox.
1. 116 N.M. 508, 864 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at 510, 864 P.2d at 326 (citing Fox, 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). For purposes of this
Note, a member Indian is an Indian living on the tribe's reservation of which he is a member. A
non-member Indian is a member of a federally recognized tribe but livihg on another tribe's
reservation.
3. See Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88
N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1975), overruled by New Mexico
Taxation and Revenue Department v. Greaves, 116 N.M. 508, 864 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1993).
4. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
5. The facts of this case are set out in Greaves, 116 N.M. at 509, 864 P.2d at 325.
6. Id.
7. 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976), overruled by New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department v.
Greaves, 116 N.M. 508, 864 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1993). The Fox court held tribal affiliation to be
of no importance in determining the tax-exempt status of Indians as long as there was the coalescence
of status as an Indian and location on a reservation. Id. at 262, 531 P.2d at 1235.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

New Mexico Decides the Issue of Taxation on Indians: Ghahate
v. Bureau of Revenue
In Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 8 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
first addressed the issue of whether the state could impose an income
tax on Indians working on a reservation. 9 The opinion addressed several
issues: the sovereign powers of American Indian Tribes 10 and state infringement on tribal self-government; Congressional power to regulate
commerce; and state authority to impose taxes on Indians." In reaching
its conclusion, the2 court did not distinguish between member and nonmember Indians.
First, in its brief discussion of tribal self-government, the Ghahate
court reiterated the policy established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Worcester v. Georgia:3 an Indian tribe is a distinct nation and the state
does not have the legal authority to regulate the affairs of Indians on
a reservation. 4 Furthermore, the Ghahate court noted that when Congress
has wished the exercise of state power, it has expressly granted states
the jurisdiction to do so."I
Second, the Ghahate court applied the federal Indian law infringement
analysis developed in Williams v. Lee 6 to state income tax imposed on
reservation Indians. In Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
allowing the exercise of state jurisdiction over tribal affairs would both
undermine the authority of tribal courts and infringe on the right of
Indians to govern themselves. 7 The Ghahate court reasoned, however,
that an income tax on Indians working on the reservation did not interfere
or inconvenience reservation self-government in any way, and concluded
8
that the infringement analysis did not bar the tax.

A.

8. 80 N.M. 98, 451 P.2d'1002 (Ct. App. 1969). Ghahate was decided before McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), in which the Supreme Court decided that reservation
Indians were exempt from state income tax.
9. Id. at 99, 451 P.2d at 1003. In Ghahate, a Zuni Indian and a Navajo Indian both worked
on the Zuni reservation deriving all of their 1967 income from that employment. Id.
10. The term "tribes" is used for general discussion for purposes of this Note, although indigenous
nations use varied terms for their collective identity, e.g., nation, pueblo, band, village.
11. 80 N.M. at 99, 451 P.2d 1003.
12. Id. at 100, 451 P.2d at 1004. Although the facts involved a Zuni Indian and a Navajo
Indian, the court treated both as reservation Indians.
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 99, 451 P.2d at 1003 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832)).
15. Id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959)).
16. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Williams, a non-Indian operating a general store on the Navajo
reservation filed suit against two Navajo Indians to collect for goods sold on credii. The Supreme
Court ruled that to grant adjudicatory jurisdiction to Arizona courts would undermine the authority
of tribal courts and infringe on the right of Indians to govern themselves. Id. at 223.
17. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 99, 451 P.2d at 1003 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 223).
18. Id. at 100, 451 P.2d at 1004.
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Third, the court addressed the whether federal law pre-empted New
Mexico's income tax on reservation Indians. The appellants first claimed

that the Wheeler-Howard Act, 9 which provides for self-government of
Indian tribes, pre-empted the state's imposition of the income tax. 20 The
court found, however, that the tax did not interfere with rights reserved
under the Act. 2' The appellants also claimed that the application of the

tax impaired a right reserved under the Indian Commerce Clause, 22 which
authorizes Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 23 The
court dismissed this claim, reasoning that the income tax did not involve
commerce in any way. 24 Appellants based their final pre-emption contention on Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission.2 5
The Warren court held that Arizona could not impose a gross proceeds
tax on sales of an Indian trader on the reservation, stating, "Congress
has taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand
that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon
traders." ' 26 The Ghahate court reasoned that since there were no com-

prehensive federal guidelines on state taxation of Indian income, federal
27

law did not pre-empt state authority on the matter.
Finally, the court addressed whether the state has the authority to
impose income taxes on Indians living on the reservation. Appellants
claimed that New Mexico's constitution contains a disclaimer 2 which
prohibits the state from taxing Indian income earned on the reservation. 29
The provision is a disclaimer of all right, title and interest to Indian
lands.3 0 The Ghahate court reasoned that the disclaimer did not preclude

an income tax derived from the lands, but only a tax directly on reservation

property.3 '
The New Mexico Court of Appeals later reversed the Ghahate decision

in Fox v. Bureau of Revenue.3 2 In deciding Fox, the court relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.3 Before analyzing Fox, it is helpful to first discuss McClanahan,
19. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1964).
20. See Your Food Stores, Inc. (NSL) v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 331-32, 361 P.2d
950, 953-54 (1961) (indicating that the Wheeler-Howard Act may prohibit the operation of state
law over Indians.).
21. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 100, 451 P.2d at 1004.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
23. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 100, 451 P.2d at 1004.
24. Id.
25. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
26. Id. at 690.
27. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 101, 451 P.2d at 1005.
28. N.M. CoNsT. art. XXI, § 2. The provision concerns a disclaimer on the part of New Mexico
concerning Indian lands. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that this is a disclaimer of a
proprietary rather than a governmental interest. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 101, 451 P.2d at 1005.
29. Ghahate, 80 N.M. at 101, 451 P.2d at 1005.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 101-02, 451 P.2d at 1005-06. The parties stipulated: "neither title, right of possession,
nor control of any of the tribal lands ... are drawn into question." Id.
32. 87 N.M. 261, 263, 531 P.2d at 1234, 1236 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d
248 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976), overruled by New Mexico Taxation and Revenue
Department v. Greaves, 116 N.M. 508, 864 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1993).
33. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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in which the Supreme Court held 34that Arizona could not impose an
income tax on reservation Indians.

The U.S. Supreme Court Speaks: Federal Law Prohibits State
Taxation of Reservation Indians
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,35 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the State of Arizona lacked jurisdiction to impose a tax
on the income of Navajo Indians who lived and worked on the reservation.3 6 The Supreme Court addressed sovereignty, pre-emption, and
infringement in reaching its conclusion.
The McClanahan court first explained that the Indian sovereignty doctrine existed from the earliest days of the U.S. government, when Indians
3
were largely permitted to govern themselves free from state interference. "
The Court noted, however, that the trend in interpreting the sovereignty
doctrine had shifted away from the presumption of tribal sovereignty as
a bar to state jurisdiction towards reliance on federal pre-emption.3" For
example, the sovereignty doctrine has not been rigidly applied in cases
where Indians have left the reservation and become assimilated into the
general community.3 9
The McClanahan court, in its pre-emption analysis, rejected Arizona's
claim that state law did not preclude state jurisdiction over Indian income.
The Court stated that, "[iun such a situation, the State has no more
jurisdiction to reach income generated on reservation lands than to tax
B.

the land itself." 4 The Court regarded the Buck Act 4I as proof of Congress'

unequivocal intent to provide a state income tax exemption for reservation
Indians. 42 The Court reasoned that because Congress provided a tax
exemption for reservation Indians, the states retained no residual authority
to impose an income tax on such individuals. 43 The Court further noted
that "state laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an
Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that
state laws shall apply."" The Court therefore held that the state income
tax was pre-empted as it interfered with matters which the relevant statutes
leave to the exclusive authority of the federal government and the Indians
themselves.

45

34. Id.
35. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). In McClanahan, Arizona attempted to impose a personal income tax
on a Navajo Indian working exclusively on the Navajo reservation. Id. at 165-66.
36. Id. at 167-181.
37. Id. at 170.
38. Id.at 172.
39. Id.at 171.
40. Id.at 181.
41. 4 U.S.C.S. §§ 105-110. The Act grants states general authority to impose an income tax on
residents of federal areas but expressly provides an exception for Indians on Indian reservations.
The statute draws no distinction between member and non-member Indians. See Buck Act, 4 U.S.C.S.

§ 109.
42.
43.
44.
45.

McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176.
Id.at 177.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 165.
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The McClanahancourt then applied an infringement analysis, addressing
the State's contention that because the state tax was on individual Indians
rather than the Navajo Nation or reservation, the state had not infringed
on tribal self-government. 6 Although the Court felt that the Williams
infringement test did not apply in this situation, 47 it recognized and
rejected the state's claim." The Supreme Court reasoned that since "appellant is an Indian and since her income is derived wholly from reservation
sources," her activity was totally within the sphere of federal and tribal
jurisdiction. 49 The McClanahan court rejected the state's contention that
it is irrelevant whether the income tax infringes on individual rights.
Instead, the court ruled that although Congress typically deals with tribes
as collective entities, the tribes are composed of individuals and the Buck
Act conferred individual rights.5 0 The McClanahan court concluded that
the "appellant's rights as a reservation Indian were violated when the
state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction to impose."'"
Shortly after the decision in McClanahan, the New Mexico Court2 of
Appeals decided the issue presented in Fox v. Bureau of Revenue.1
C. New Mexico Follows the U.S. Supreme Court and Overturns
Ghahate
Fox v. Bureau of Revenue53 presented, for the first time in New Mexico,
the issue of whether a non-member Indian working on the reservation
was a "reservation Indian" for state tax purposes.14 In deciding Fox,
the court of appeals addressed the plaintiff taxpayer as a non-member
reservation Indian." In comparing the facts of Fox to the facts of
McClanahan, the Court of Appeals recognized tribal affiliation as the
only significant difference. 6 McClanahan involved a Navajo working on
the Navajo Reservation and the taxpayer in Fox was a Comanche working
on the Navajo Reservation. In applying the McClanahan rationale, the
Fox court focused on the coalescence of status (Indian) and situs (res-

46. Id. at 179.
47. Id. Cases applying the Williams test typically involved situations involving non-Indians and
tribal affairs, in which both the state and tribe have interests in asserting jurisdiction. In McClanahan,
non-Indians were not involved.
48. Id. at 181.
49. Id. at 179.
50. Id. at 181.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976), overruled by New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department v.
Greaves, 116 N.M. 508, 864 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1993).
53. Id. In Fox, the New Mexico Bureau of Revenue attempted to deny the refund of income
tax imposed on a Comanche Indian, who resided and worked on the Navajo Indian Reservation.
The taxpayer was not enrolled in the Navajo tribe. Id.
54. Id. at 262, 531 P.2d at 1235.
55. Id. at 261, 531 P.2d at 1234. This approach differed from the method used in Ghahate v.
Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 98, 451 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1969), in which the court of appeals
did not distinguish between member and non-member Indians. See supra notes 8-31 and accompanying
text.
56. Fox, 87 N.M. at 261-62, 531 P.2d at 1234-35.
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ervation).17 The court cited language in McClanahan which stated, "[T]he
tax is therefore unlawful as applied to reservation Indians with income
derived wholly from reservation resources.''58 The Court of Appeals
expressly noted that there was no case law finding that tribal affiliation
was crucial where an Indian was on the reservation of another tribe.5 9
The Fox court reviewed both criminal and civil jurisdiction for guidance
in determining the definition of a reservation Indian.60 In regard to
determining jurisdiction for criminal purposes, the court noted that the
U.S. Supreme Court, in discussing the Major Crimes Act, 6' had defined
a reservation Indian as including Indians committing the offense on the
reservation who "belong to that or some other tribe.

Begay, 63

' 62

In addition, the

Fox court cited State v.
in which the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the state did not have jurisdiction over an Indian driving
an automobile on the Navajo reservation." The Fox court noted that in
Begay "there was no mention of tribal affiliation,
status as Indian and
'65
situs on a reservation having been shown."

The Fox court also focused on a New Mexico civil case in which no
distinction was drawn between member and non-member Indians. In
Valdez v. Johnson,66 the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld exclusive
tribal jurisdiction
for a civil dispute arising on the reservation between
67
two Indians.

After reviewing the existing case law, the Fox court concluded that
once status, as an Indian and situs on the reservation was shown, tribal
affiliation was of no importance in determining the status of reservation
Indians. 68 In addressing the "assimilated in the general community"
57. Id. at 262, 571 P.2d at 1235.
58. Id. (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S 164, 165 (1973)). See also O'Cheskey v. Hunt, 85 N.M.
388, 512 P.2d 961 (1973). In O'Cheskey, the New Mexico Supreme Court quashed a writ of certiorari,
holding that for the state to impose its income and gross receipts tax on reservation Indians working
solely within the reservation would interfere with matters left to the federal government and the
Indians themselves. Id.
59. Fox, 87 N.M. at 262, 531 P.2d at 1235.
60. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1885) (Indian committing crime on a reservation
other than own tribe's reservation is still under federal jurisdiction of Major Crimes Act.); State
v. Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958) (state did not have jurisdiction over an Indian driving
an automobile on the Navajo without mention of tribal affiliation).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1984). The Major Crimes Act enumerates 14 crimes which, if committed
by an Indian against another Indian or non-Indian, grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts.
The definition of an Indian under the Major Crimes Act is a person with some degree of Indianblood and is recognized as Indian by an Indian tribe or by the federal government. See United
States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449 (1984); See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
62. Fox, 87 N.M. at 262, 531 P.2d at 1235. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1885)). Furthermore, a taxpayer's status an Indian and situs on the reservation creates jurisdiction
to extradite. Id. (citing Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1003 (1970)).
63. 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958).
64. Fox, 87 N.M. at 263, 531 P.2d at 1236.
65. Id. (citing Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017.)
66. 68 N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961). Both plaintiff and defendant were residents of the Isleta
Pueblo, although both were not members. The opinion made no mention of tribal affiliation.
67. Fox, 87 N.M. at 263, 531 P.2d at 1236. (citing Valdez, 68 N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961);
Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958)).
68. Id.
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doctrine described in McClanahan, the Fox court interpreted the doctrine
to require something more than living on other reservations. 69 The court
therefore held that the taxpayer's status, although working on another
tribe's reservation, was that of a "reservation Indian" within the meaning
of the McClanahan decision and thus the taxpayer
was exempt from the
70
New Mexico Bureau of Revenue's income tax.
D. Other Jurisdictions Prohibit Taxation of Non-member Indians
. Other state courts have faced the issue of taxing non-member reservation
Indians, and most have found a lack of state authority to impose income
taxes. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in White Eagle v. Dorgan,7'
held that Indian income earned on the reservation was not subject to
state taxation.72 In deciding the issue, the court treated all the taxpayers
as reservation Indians, despite the fact that one was not a member of
the tribe for which he was working. 73 The White Eagle court reasoned,
consistent with McClanahan, that in the absence of an agreement by the
Indians residing on the reservation accepting North Dakota's power to
impose income tax on them, the state has no jurisdiction to do so. 7"
Idaho considered the issue of non-member Indian taxation in In Re
Mehojah.7 5 The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals reasoned that the power
to tax, or not to tax, is one of the most important attributes of tribal
sovereignty, and the imposition of a state tax would constitute
a usurpation
76
of that function, even where a non-member is involved.
The Montana Supreme Court addressed the narrow issue of whether
the state could tax a non-member Indian's income derived from reservation
resources in Boxer v. State.77 The court looked to McClanahan for
guidance and properly applied the Supreme Court's reasoning to an income
tax involving a non-member Indian working on the reservation. 78 In
reaching its conclusion that the state may not tax such an income, the
court stated the primary factor in limiting state jurisdiction is whether
the activity occurred in "areas set aside by treaty for the exclusive use

69. Id. (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
70. Id.
71. 209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1973). Dorgan involved four Indian taxpayers residing on the Standing
Rock Indian Reservation, three of which were Standing Rock Sioux tribal members, the fourth of
which was a member of another tribe. Id. at 622.
72. Id. at 624.
73. Id. at 622-23.
74. Id. at 623.
75. No. 73-1-27, 1974 WL 21924 (Idaho Bd. Tax App. 1974). The facts involved a Kaw Indian
from Oklahoma working for the Shoshonee-Bannock Tribe on the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho.
Id. at *1.
76. Id. at *3.
77. 583 P.2d 1059 (Mont. 1978). Boxer was a Chippewa Indian not enrolled in any tribe. His
wife is an enrolled member of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation. They
lived on the Fort Peck Reservation in 1968 and Boxer earned money within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation. Id. at 1060-61.
78. Id. at 1062. The Boxer court relied on the pre-emption analysis employed in McClanahan.
Id.
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and control of Indians." '79 The Boxer court disagreed with the state's
contention that the unenrolled status of an Indian denies them the protection of McClanahan.80 The Montana Supreme Court read the phrase
"reservation Indian" to mean Indians residing on the reservation, irrespective of their enrollment in the tribe.8"
ANALYSIS OF THE GREA VES DECISION
In Greaves, the New Mexico Court of Appeals expressly overruled Fox,
holding that income earned by Indians on reservations of which they are
not tribal members is taxable by the state.8 2 Although the court acknowledged that the policy affording American Indian tribes freedom
from state control and jurisdiction is "deeply rooted in our nation's
history," 83 it departed from this principle in Greaves. In a brief opinion,
the court relied on language borrowed from U.S. Supreme Court opinions
to justify state taxing authority over the income of non-member Indians
working on a reservation. However, the Greaves court failed to present
any cogent reasoning to support its conclusion. Most importantly, the
court failed to recognize a Congressional amendment which effectively
overturned the United States Supreme Court's Duro v. Reina decision ,84
a case on which the court of appeals relied in reaching its conclusion
in Greaves. Moreover, the decision in Greaves reveals the court's misapprehension of the demographic realities of Indian communities.
In Greaves, the court of appeals determined that the Fox decision was
based on a misinterpretation of federal law.85 The Fox court read
McClanahan to mean the state has no jurisdiction to tax Indian income
earned on the reservation, regardless of tribal affiliation.8 6 By piecing
court determined its
together U.S. Supreme Court dicta, the Greaves
87
previous reading of McClanahan to be mistaken.
IV.

Sac and Fox: Absent Express Congressional Authorization, States
Do Not Have Jurisdiction to Tax Tribal Members Who Live and
Work in Indian Country
The Greaves opinion quotes language from Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Sac and Fox Nation8 8 which states, "[McClanahan held] a state was

A.

79. Id. at 1063 (quoting McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1064. The court cited to the New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision in Fox when
it reasoned that situs on the reservation and status as an Indian is sufficient for exemption from
state income tax. Id. The Boxer court found no cases in which the enrolled status of an Indian
was crucial. Id.
82. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department v. Greaves, 116 N.M. 508, 509, 864 P.2d
324, 325 (Ct. App. 1993).
83. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
84. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). This case was overturned by Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (1990)) [hereinafter 1991 Defense Appropriations Act].
85. Greaves, 116 N.M. at 509, 864 P.2d at 325. The court reasoned that, based on recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, it had misinterpreted McClanahan as applying to non-member Indians.
Id.
86. Id. (citing Fox, 87 N.M. at 262-63, 531 P.2d at 1235-36).
87. Id.
88. 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993). Sac and Fox Tribe sought a permanent injunction barring the
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without jurisdiction to subject a tribal member living on the reservation,
and whose income derived from reservation sources, to a State income
tax absent an express authorization from Congress." 8 9 Without providing
any reasoning, the Greaves court offers the Supreme Court dicta as
support for the notion that Sac and Fox excludes tribal members working
on a reservation from a state income tax exemption. The issue before
the Sac and Fox court, however, was solely whether the state could tax
members of the Sac and Fox Nation. Since the narrower issue of whether
the state could tax members of other tribes working on the Sac and Fox
reservation was not before the Supreme Court, it is not clear why the
Greaves court regards the language as supportive of its conclusion. The
Supreme Court in Sac and Fox held, consistent with McClanahan, that
"absent explicit congressional direction to the contrary, we presume
against a State's having the jurisdiction to tax within Indian country." 9
The Greaves court does not cite to any authority where Congress grants
New Mexico jurisdiction to impose an income tax on the reservation.
B.

Cigarette Tax as a Basis For Income Tax
The Greaves court also extracts language from Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation9' [hereinafter Colville]
which states, "[Flederal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt [the state of]
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not members of the
Tribe. "92 The opinion cites the language without providing a nexus between
a tax on cigarettes and a tax on reservation income. The Greaves court's
assumption that the quote applies to income taxes runs counter to other
language in Colville. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Colville also states, "[T]he Washington Enabling Act reflects an intent
that the State not tax reservation lands or income derived therefrom
.... ,,9 The Supreme Court distinguished the cigarette tax as a transaction
concerning personalty with no substantial connection to reservation lands, 94
yet the court of appeals in Greaves reads the language as Supreme Court
approval of a income tax on reservation Indians.
C. Duro Overturned by Amendment-No Recognition in Greaves
In Greaves, the court of appeals quoted U.S. Supreme Court language
which appears to resolve the issue of whether McClanahan applies to

Oklahoma Tax Commission from taxing the income of its members. The court held that absent
explicit direction to the contrary, the state did not have the authority to impose such a tax. Id.
at 1993.
89. Greaves, 116 N.M. at 509, 864 P.2d at 325 (quoting Sac and Fox, 113 S. Ct. at 1990).
90. Sac and Fox, 113 S. Ct. at 1993.
91. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). This case involved Washington's imposition of a sales tax on cigarettes
and other personal property from transactions occurring on the reservation. Id.
92. Greaves, 116 N.M. at 509, 864 P.2d at 325 (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 160).
93. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted).
94. Id.
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non-member Indians. However, a juxtaposition of the quote with the
reasoning of the Supreme Court decision reveals two exceptions which
would apply to a tribal judge working on the reservation. Most detrimental
to the Greaves opinion is the Court of Appeals' failure to recognize an
amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act which overturns the decision.
The Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina95 held that tribes do not retain
criminal jurisdiction over minor crimes involving non-member Indians.
The Greaves court relied primarily on a quote from Duro which states
that the McClanahan decision "does not apply to taxation of nonmembers, even where they are Indians." 96 Although the quote is seemingly
clear, the context from which the quote is removed does not support an
income tax on a tribal judge's income. The Supreme Court's concern in
Duro was the assertion of tribal authority over non-members who cannot
participate in the tribal government. 97 The Duro court also recognized
"broader retained tribal powers outside the criminal context" such as
civil jurisdiction over non-members. 98 The Court noted that the civil
authority over non-members typically arises from "consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements. '" 99
The conclusion that Greaves, as a non-member Indian, may be taxed
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Duro. Working
under contract as the Chief Judge of the Jicarilla tribal court, Greaves
not only played a significant role in tribal affairs but also worked under
a consensual relationship with the tribe: two factors which grant exclusive
tribal authority over non-members. Not only did the Greaves court extract
the Duro language out of context, it revealed no awareness of the
Congressional amendment which overturned the Supreme Court's Duro
decision.
Shortly after the Duro decision, Congress passed an amendment to the
Indian Civil Rights Act ("Act") °0 to correct the Court's reading of
Congressional intent regarding the scope of tribal and federal power and
thus, to overturn Duro.0 1 The failure to reconcile the amendment's effect
with the language the Greaves court borrows from the Duro opinion,

95. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). Duro was a Mission Indian who shot and killed a Salt River PimaMaricopa Indian on the Salt River Reservation. The Supreme Court ruled that the Salt River Tribe
did not have misdemeanor jurisdiction over Duro. Id. at 679.
96. Greaves, 116 N.M. at 509, 864 P.2d at 325 (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at 686-87).
97. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688. The court noted that there was no evidence that non-members have
a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements. Id. at 687 (quoting Colville,
447 U.S. at 161).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 688 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341.
101. See Hopi Tribe v. Manycow, 21 ILR 6080 (Hopi Tr. Ct., May 25, 1994) (holding that Duro
is no longer good law after the enactment of the 1991 Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 101511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990)
(reaffirming the authority of Indian tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-member Indians); Mousseaux v. United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433 (1992) (holding that
Congress intended the amendments to nullify the Duro decision and that the statute must be given
a retroactive effect).
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creates a void in the court's analysis. Congress amended the Act's definition of "powers of self-government" to read: "the inherent power of
Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."' 0 2 The amendment also adds a definition of
the term "Indian" which is determinative of Congress' intent to clarify
the scope of tribal and federal power in other jurisdictional disputes,
and should not be limited to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.0 3 The
amendment clearly draws a line between Indians and non-Indians with
respect to tribal and federal jurisdiction, and not between members and
non-members. Indeed, when Congress amended the Duro decision, the
Conference Committee Report left little doubt regarding the impetus for
change. The Report states, "Congress has recognized that tribal governments afford a broad array of rights and privileges to non-tribal
members."' 4 Examples the Report referred to include non-tribal member
Indians owning property on Indian reservations, their children attending
tribal schools, and their families receiving health care from tribal hospitals
and clinics.1°5 Federal programs and services are provided to Indian people
because of their status as Indians without regard to whether their tribal
membership is the same as their reservation residence. The Report clearly
states, "[t]he issue of who is an Indian for purposes of Federal law is
well-settled as a function of two hundred years of Constitutional and
case law and Federal statutes."' 6
An application of the Duro amendment to a reading of McClanahan°7
would result in a preclusion of state income tax authority over all Indians
who work and reside on a reservation, not merely those who are members
of the tribe. In holding that reservation Indians are exempt from state
taxation, the McClanahan court considered the fact that appellant was
an Indian and that her income was derived wholly from reservation
resources.108 The Duro amendment not only overturns the Supreme Court
decision, it buttresses the McClanahan rationale that Indian taxing authority remains solely with federal and tribal governments. However, the

102. 1991 Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b) 104 Stat. 1856, 1892
(1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990)). Congress' purpose was to rectify a
jurisdictional void. According to the Conference Committee Report accompanying Public Law 101511, "those who identify themselves as Indian and are recognized under Federal Law as Indian,
may come onto an Indian reservation, commit a criminal misdemeanor, and know that there is no
governmental entity that has the jurisdiction to prosecute them for their criminal acts." H. Rep.
No. 938, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 132 (1990). Congress, in plain language, overturned the result of
Duro in the definition of "powers of self-government." Congress took further action, however, to
resolve the dispute of "who is an Indian?" by adding the definition of Indian and clearly drawing
the line between Indian and non-Indian.
103. "'Indian' means any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
as an Indian under section 1153, title 18, United States Code, if that person were to commit an
offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that section applies." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4).
104. H. Rep. No. 938, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1990).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
108. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
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New Mexico Court of Appeals failed to recognize the amendment in
ruling on Greaves.
Furthermore, the Greaves court disregarded the standards of constructing taxing laws applicable to Indians. The Supreme Court in Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians'°9 stated that "[t]he canons of construction
applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians.""10 The Court stated one canon as
"states may tax Indians only when Congress has manifested clearly its
consent to such taxation." '1' In articulating the principle, the Court did
not distinguish between Indians and member Indians. Congress' decision
to include all Indians within the scope of federal and tribal authority
by all courts, as the Supreme Court often defers
should be given credence
2
to Congress' intent."
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision in Greaves will egregiously
affect New Mexico's Indian population. New Mexico's twenty-two Indian
communities do not constitute homogeneous groups of tribal members.
Indian people living on reservations include Bureau of Indian Affairs
and Indian Health Services employees, Indians who have married a
member of another tribe and their offspring, and increasing numbers of
Indians who reside on and work on other reservations." 3 Furthermore,
the Indian Child Welfare Act 1 4 provides placement preferences in the
adoptions of Indian children to members of the Indian child's extended
family, Indian foster homes, or other Indian organizations. The logical
result of these preferences is that many Indian children will be placed
on reservations of tribes other than the tribe in which they are eligible
to be enrolled. A state income tax on non-member Indians working on
a reservation creates a disservice to tribal governments without a balance
of providing services to the tribes. The Greaves decision allows New
Mexico to collect revenue from Indians in which the state has no interest.
After the Duro amendment, the state retains no criminal jurisdiction,
nor is the state likely to provide health, education, or other social services
to reservation Indians. The existence of New Mexico's twenty-two Indian
communities creates some employment opportunities for Indians. However, the state income tax on non-members disenfranchises reservation
Indians from seeking employment on other reservations because the tax
increases the strains on already low-paying tribal jobs. The tribal employer
will have to compensate for the state income tax which further depletes

109. 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
110. Id. at 766 (quoting Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985)).
111. Id. (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)); see also Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363, 365-66 (1930).
112. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
113. See generally Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal
Courts Over Non-member Indians, 38 FED. B. NEWS AND J. 70.
114. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
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limited tribal resources. The formidable social problems of poverty, unemployment, and undereducation on New Mexico's Indian communities
will only increase as a result of Greaves.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its soundly reasoned Fox decision, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
originally disapproved of the state imposing an income tax on nonmember reservation Indians. In Fox, the Court of Appeals correctly
recognized that the coalescence of status as an Indian and situs on the
reservation was sufficient to create an exemption from state taxation.
However, in Greaves, the court took a more parsimonious position on
the scope of tribal and federal power and allowed the state to tax a
reservation Indian working as a tribal judge. The court of appeals unfortunately relies on language borrowed from a Supreme Court opinion
which was overruled by Congress. The Greaves decision reveals the New
Mexico Court of Appeals' unawareness of the Duro amendment and a
misunderstanding of the parameters of tribal sovereignty.
KYLE T. NAYBACK

